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well-being policy, neglects i) important motivation problems on the part of government 
actors, such as incentives to manipulate indicators, but also on the part of citizens to 
truthfully report their well-being, and ii) procedural utility as a source of well-being. Instead, 
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1 Introduction 
Democratic policymaking is fundamentally about searching for a consensus about basic rules 
that allow people to best pursue their ideas of the good life, both individually and collectively. 
People delegated to serve in state and public authorities are thereby selected and motivated 
to support this pursuit with their work, their selection and motivation being shaped by state 
institutions.1 
It is within the foregoing procedural perspective of government and state that this short article 
comments on the role of empirical subjective well-being research in public policy.2 In essence, 
evidence from this new and intriguing development in the social sciences is here seen to serve 
as informational input into the political process at all levels and for all actors involved, citizens 
being central. This is indeed most valuable, as it provides a steadily increasing basis of insights 
that are promising.3 However, this perspective also rejects the idea that, based on the 
promises of the approach, we should adopt a new policy perspective that is oriented towards 
a decision rule maximizing well-being in terms of some aggregate measure of subjective well-
being. This social engineering perspective, implicit in much reasoning about well-being policy, 
proposing a technocratic decision-rule at the core of political decision-making is not only not 
necessary to make productive use of the new insights but risks i) disregarding some motivation 
 
1 The constitutional political economy approach to public policy rests on a contractarian perspective 
that has evolved in political philosophy since Thomas Hobbes (1651) famous work entitled “Leviathan” 
and is at the core of John Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” (1971). In economics, it was championed by 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and further developed by Brennan and Buchanan (1986). 
2 The article builds and further develops arguments that have been presented in earlier work (see, e.g., 
Frey and Stutzer 2012, 2019, Odermatt and Stutzer 2018). 
3 There is an enormous body of literature that is concerned with understanding subjective well-being. 
In economics, there are a series of monographs including, e.g., Frey and Stutzer (2002a), Layard (2005), 
Frey (2008), and Graham (2017), as well as review articles including, e.g., Frey and Stutzer (2002b), 
Stutzer and Frey (2010) and Clark (2018). For contributions from a psychological perspective, see, e.g., 
the collections in David et al. (2013), Sheldon and Lucas (2014) or the handbook by Diener et al. (2018). 
Good overviews of cross-country comparisons of well-being are provided in the seven World 
Happiness Reports published so far (Helliwell et al., 2019). 
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problems, and ii) neglecting some basic aspects of the role of institutions in subjective well-
being as well as procedural utility as a source of subjective well-being. 
In the following, I first briefly highlight some advantages of evidence from research on 
subjective well-being and its value for public policy. It echoes the proposal on how to make 
use of proxy measures of individual welfare based on individual self-reports in public policy by 
Frijters et al. (2019). As practical instruments to support decision-making, the life satisfaction 
approach and the well-being cost-effectiveness analysis offer practical extensions of the 
toolbox. Second, I argue that public policy in general should, however, not be equated with 
the solving of technical valuation problems. Public policy is primarily about understanding and 
addressing societal problems in a discursive democratic process. In fact, there are various 
challenges for well-being evidence-based public policy even when not part of a well-being 
maximization approach. I briefly mention some of the obstacles. Third, a series of motivational 
issues are raised, challenging the implicit view of a benevolent social engineer, and an 
unbiased representation of people’s well-being. Fourth, I take up procedural utility as a key 
source of individual well-being that is neglected when people merely report mental states. 
Overall, I argue that well-being research should be oriented towards gaining insights that 
improve the diagnosis of societal problems and help to evaluate alternative institutional 
arrangements to address them, as inputs into the democratic process.  
2 The subjective well-being lens: valuable complementary perspective on individual 
welfare 
Traditional public policy in many areas is challenged by evidence that links possible policy 
outcomes directly to individual welfare consequences in terms of reported subjective well-
being. This is a most welcome development, as it invites reflection and reconsideration of 
beliefs about the costs and benefits of various policies. Complementary attempts to assess 
policy consequences in terms of some direct proxy measure for individual welfare naturally 
focus on ends rather than means to an end, such as individual or aggregate income. The 
orientation is towards the subjective well-being of current and future generations rather than 
towards their material well-being.4  
 
4 The inspirations and lessons of empirical well-being research for public policy are discussed in many 
recent publications, including, for example, Diener et al., (2009), Bok (2010), Hämäläinen and 
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2.1 Proxy for individual welfare 
Based on the accumulated evidence, it is fair to say that the evaluation metrics applied in 
empirical well-being research fit people’s appraisals of their lives better than the alternative 
metrics constructed around income, and are thus comparatively good proxies for individual 
welfare (see, e.g., Clark 2016).5 At the very least, we can learn from people’s reported 
judgments in addition to what they choose. We get ex post evaluations of individuals’ 
experiences.  
These qualities render measures of subjective well-being an attractive tool for evaluating 
policies and institutions. In particular, measures of subjective well-being allow moving 
towards analysis of the net effects of policy interventions (including spillovers between 
individuals) and the experiences of particular circumstances (see Odermatt and Stutzer 2018 
for many examples and references). This includes the study of covariates of subjective well-
being, which helps us to understand the critical determinants of individual welfare, involving 
both tangible and intangible (psychological) aspects. And it facilitates identifying institutions 
that enable individuals to better meet their preferences. In sum, based on measures of 
subjective well-being, it is possible to uncover welfare consequences that are partly 
unobservable when traditional measures of economic and social progress such as national 
income are used.  
2.2 Learning about individual weaknesses reducing individual well-being 
This is particularly relevant for policy evaluations in areas that might involve suboptimal 
behavior and where, for example, consumption vices turn into diseases.6 The well-being 
 
Michaelson (2014), and the reports of the Legatum Institute (O’Donnell et al., 2014) and the Global 
Council for Happiness and Wellbeing (Sachs et al. 2019). 
5 The specific standards might, however, differ quite substantially across people: Some individuals 
might favor a reasoned ex ante evaluation, while others might wish to adopt a distant perspective, 
reflecting on one’s life ex post facto. Still others might emphasize the affective experiences of life as it 
is lived. Finally, there are individuals who prefer a cognitive appraisal of the overall quality of life as 
captured in evaluative measures such as satisfaction with life. 
6 A case in point are the effects of tobacco control policies on people’s subjective well-being. In an 
early contribution, Gruber and Mullainathan (2005) find a positive effect of higher cigarette taxes on 
the reported happiness of likely smokers for the United States. Based on a similar approach in a study 
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perspective is thus compatible with the notion in behavioral economics that people do not 
always behave in their own best interests (weakening the assumption of consumer 
sovereignty in rational choice analyses and the strong (or exclusive) reliance on observed 
behavior as a welfare criterion). It provides a tool for policy evaluation in areas where decision 
utility (as reflected in behavior) systematically diverges from experienced utility (contributing 
to the approaches in behavioral welfare economics extensively discussed in Bernheim and 
Taubinsky, 2018).7 If some behavioral choices are suboptimal from an individual’s perspective, 
research can then seek to identify the conditions under which such choices are less likely or 
at least less harmful to the individual. Research on subjective well-being can thus provide a 
valuable input for the discourse on people’s limitations in pursuing their ideas of the good 
life.8  
2.3 Valuing non-tangible and public goods 
The valuation of non-tangible and public goods like environmental quality or the fear of 
certain risks happening in terms of subjective well-being have direct utility in some practical 
policy work in which, formally or informally, the costs and benefits of a given project are 
analyzed. Otherwise, the benefits from public goods are difficult to measure, as the marginal 
utility to consumers is not reflected in market exchanges. Given that an appropriate empirical 
design is found, the marginal utility of public goods (or the disutility of public bads) is captured 
 
for member countries of the European Union, Odermatt and Stutzer (2015) observe the contrary, i.e. 
a reduction in reported satisfaction with life upon an increase in cigarette taxes. Moreover, they find 
that smokers who would like to quit smoking report higher life satisfaction if there is a comprehensive 
smoking ban in place. Overall, the evidence for Europe is consistent with a model of cue-triggered 
decision-making that prevents “wannabe quitters” from pursuing their long-term plans if people in 
their environment smoke and thus create external stimuli leading to a craving.  
7 The inconsistency between different conceptualizations of utility discussed in Kahneman et al. (1997) 
has been one of the starting points of subjective well-being research in economics and inspired 
theoretical as well as empirical research on the misprediction of future well-being (see, e.g., 
Loewenstein et al., 2003, Kahneman and Thaler, 2006, Frey and Stutzer, 2014, Odermatt and Stutzer, 
2019).  
8 Similar arguments in favor of indicators of experienced well-being can be formulated for policy 
contexts in which people lack information (Sunstein, 2019). 
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by calculating the partial correlation between the amount of public goods (or public bads) and 
individuals’ reported subjective well-being, controlling for many other determinants. Given 
this information, two kinds of applied welfare analysis are possible. First, by comparing the 
marginal utilities of public goods to the marginal utility of income, the trade-off between 
income and public goods can be calculated. This is the idea behind the Life Satisfaction 
Approach (Frey et al., 2010, Welsch and Kühling, 2009) as an additional evaluation method 
complementing the stated preference and revealed preference approaches.9 Second, rather 
than transforming the benefits back into monetary terms to include them in the same units 
as costs in a cost benefit analysis, information on benefits can be kept in well-being terms and 
directly related to costs. This well-being cost effectiveness analysis (WCEA) proposed in Dolan 
and Fujiwara (2016) and Frijters et al. (2019) has the advantage that it is not affected by any 
biases in the calculation of the marginal utility of income (an issue that has turned out to be 
most challenging). However, with WCEA, only projects can be compared that express at least 
some of the benefits in terms of subjective well-being (applying the same metric, for example, 
an eleven-point life satisfaction scale). WCEA thus becomes more interesting and informative, 
the more projects have been analyzed for their well-being benefits per Euro or Pound. 
2.4 So should we then maximize individual welfare based on reported subjective well-
being? 
Given the promises of the new well-being measures, to what extent should we rethink public 
policy? For Frijters et al. (2019), the advanced possibilities for valuing projects lend themselves 
to a new perspective in formulating public policy. The perspective reads as follows: “If we 
envisage a self-financing tax change, we simply evaluate how this alters the happiness of each 
member of the population and aggregate these changes” (p. 19). Or “if we are considering a 
new regulation, we simply add up its effects on happiness across all members of the 
population” (p. 19). In the following, I will argue against this position for a new public policy 
paradigm. In particular, public policy in general should not be equated with the solving of 
technical valuation problems. Public policy is primarily about understanding and addressing 
 
9 The Life Satisfaction Approach has, among other applications, been used to value airport noise 
nuisance (van Praag and Baarsma, 2005), air pollution (Welsch, 2006; Luechinger, 2009; Levinson, 
2012), crime (Manning et al., 2016), flood hazards (Luechinger and Raschky, 2009), terrorism (Frey et 
al., 2009), and wind turbines (Krekel and Zerrahn, 2017). 
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societal problems in a discursive democratic process and contributions from well-being 
research should be oriented towards this process. 
3 Technical and conceptual challenges for policy analyses based on well-being research  
Independently of how one evaluates the effectiveness (as well as the desirability) of the 
movement calling for more evidence-based public policy, the production of high-quality 
evidence is demanding and costly. This might hold specifically for the causal effects of some 
circumstances or some policy (intervention) on people’s subjective well-being. I briefly 
present four challenges. In my view, they are important to keep in mind when addressing 
technical valuation problems in the cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analyses mentioned 
above (and suggest that we are still at the beginning with these applications). More generally, 
the technical challenges also indicate “security gaps” of a maximization approach regarding 
the risks of mistakes as well as of manipulation. A procedural perspective is likely less prone 
to these kinds of risks, as the corresponding evidence is less directly linked to policy decisions 
and has first to survive the political discussion process.   
3.1 Causal effects 
To get an idea of the never-observed counterfactual well-being of a person if she or he were 
not to be treated with some life circumstances or some policy is very difficult. Most of the 
evidence in empirical research on subjective well-being is correlational. Unobserved and thus 
often omitted third factors driving both life circumstances and well-being outcomes often 
offer plausible alternative explanations for observed statistical relationships. Moreover, more 
and more evidence emphasizes how the motivational force of being in a happy state of mind 
affects people’s behavior (see Lyubomirsky et al., 2005 for a review). For both mechanisms 
that hamper the causal interpretations of statistical relationships, a case in point is the 
correlation between individuals’ income and their subjective well-being. 
In response, the search is for evidence from research adopting some experimental or quasi-
experimental design. For future policy-relevant research, this is probably one way to go, but 
so far, the evidence base that lives up to this standard is rather limited.  
3.2 Effect heterogeneity, extrapolation and scaling 
Attributing an average well-being premium or reduction to some change in individuals’ life 
circumstances is not the only difficulty though. The concrete policy questions might also 
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involve particular groups of people for whom the effect of some change in living conditions is 
expected to be smaller or larger than the average. For example, an income transfer to sick 
people might improve their lot relatively more if privately financed healthcare services are the 
critical inputs for living well. However, if the crucial condition is social contact, more or less 
financial means would be expected to affect well-being relatively less (see, e.g., Finkelstein et 
al., 2013 for a related analysis). 
Some well identified treatment effect of certain living conditions might thus be of little help if 
effect heterogeneity is likely. Experimental evidence often captures local estimates regarding 
some change in the affected outcome variable that is difficult to transfer to other contexts or 
to extrapolate. The well-being effects of education may serve to illustrate this. Based on 
advanced econometric designs, the effect of an extra year of compulsory education in the 
United Kingdom (following a reform in 1972) has been studied. While a first study reports a 
positive effect on life satisfaction (Oreopoulos, 2007), a second study detects a negative one 
(Jung and Clark, 2017), the latter estimation being included in the table of key findings in 
Frijters et al. (2019, p. 15). Independently of whether the reform was beneficial to those 
bound by the reform in their decision to leave school, it is unclear whether the findings offer 
an ‘externally’ valid estimate for policies that increase years of schooling. Imagine, for 
example, a policy proposal for a mandatory earlier (pre-) school enrollment. The new regime 
would replace private (pre-)school and household internal arrangements that previously 
existed affecting well-being in a way that is difficult to compare with the (long-term) 
consequences for children and parents of attending school up to a higher age and entering 
the labor market later (as underlay the original policy analysis). Moreover, conditions 
exploited in instrumental variable designs might affect people’s subjective well-being via 
various other mechanisms than the one econometrically modeled. Given how broadly 
measures of subjective well-being pick up consequences on people’s lives, such effects seem 
particularly relevant in well-being research. Both arguments suggest that the evidence should 
be put more in the context of the underlying policy variation (or the instrumental variables), 
offering more or less meaningful lessons for specific policy proposals.  
The effects of a successful intervention might not even be representative if the very same 
intervention is applied again or rolled out to more people. Neglecting any publication bias, the 
policy experiment that has proven most successful in a competition of interventions is in fact 
more probably a false positive (Al-Ubaydli et al., 2019). Moreover, experiments might have 
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taken place where the expected positive effects were largest and the people engaging in them 
most motivated (see, e.g., Helliwell et al. 2019, p. 20). These two aspects add to possible 
negative network or equilibrium effects (see below) and diseconomies of scale. 
3.3 Global measures 
While global measures (for example of satisfaction with life) have the great advantage that 
they leave the aggregation and weighting of well-being judgments across different domains 
of life to the individuals surveyed, they come with the inevitable disadvantage that they are 
less sensitive to changes in some individual circumstances. Accordingly, effects on subjective 
well-being must either be very large to be detected with some statistical precision in an 
empirical evaluation or else very large samples are necessary. Specific evaluations then 
become rather costly. Thus, a trade-off emerges between adopting a comprehensive but less 
sensitive measure on the one hand, and more specific indicators that help to assess 
consequences for well-being on the other.  
3.4 Equilibrium effects 
If research provides information about outcomes linked to individual well-being, it is tempting 
to suggest policy interventions that strengthen positive outcomes and diminish negative ones, 
by trading them off in order to obtain an optimal policy mix that maximizes some empirical 
indicator of subjective well-being. Unemployment is a case in point. One might propose that, 
to improve the lot of the unemployed, the social stigma related to unemployment should be 
attenuated, and, to reduce the economic insecurity of the employed during a crisis, 
employment protection should be extended (see, e.g., Luechinger et al., 2010 for evidence on 
the well-being costs of general unemployment). However, such conclusions might be 
premature. Regarding the supporting of the unemployed, the personal psychological costs of 
unemployment due to a strong social work norm (see, e.g., Clark, 2003, Stutzer and Lalive, 
2006) might be functional or even necessary in order to maintain a generous and financially 
sustainable social benefit system. These costs help to limit moral hazard; namely, that citizens 
do not search less intensively for re-employment when receiving higher unemployment 
benefits. With regard to the aggregate level, increased job protection might benefit those who 
already have a job (see, for example, Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2009). However, it is also likely 
to make employers more reluctant to hire new workers, which is detrimental for the job 
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prospects of those who are unemployed. Thus, stronger labor protection rights might lead to 
longer individual unemployment spells and to higher general unemployment.  
These classic arguments highlight the importance of equilibrium effects and potential 
(unintended) side effects when thinking about policy interventions. Moreover, they highlight 
the limitations of an approach that focuses on an optimal outcome mix. 
4 Incentive issues in well-being policy 
4.1 Motivation and Manipulation 
Engagement for the explicit goal of an increase in people’s well-being might provide a 
direction many people in the public sector can associate themselves with, contributing to a 
positive public sector motivation. This very goal might indeed have been the reason that they 
chose to work in the public sector in the first place. Next to some intrinsic motivation, people 
involved in public policy face various external incentives and pursue their ideas of the common 
good as well as their own private good. These fundamental aspects are neglected when a well-
being maximization approach is proposed that implicitly rests on the view of a benevolent and 
unconstrained government. The critique of traditional welfare economics (see, e.g., Mueller, 
2003) thus also applies and holds lessons for productively dealing with well-being policy (Frey 
and Stutzer, 2019). 
In general, some mechanical implementation of well-being measures in the policy process is 
likely to induce strategic interactions between all the actors involved, including citizens. Once 
a specific aggregate happiness indicator has become established as being politically relevant, 
the government, public bureaucracy, and various interest groups have an incentive to 
manipulate it. This has proved to be true for various policy-relevant indicators before, like 
gross national product, measures of poverty and crime, or the rates of unemployment and 
inflation. For example, when the unemployment rate had become a politically crucial 
indicator, governments started to influence it in order to paint a better picture of the state of 
the labor market than was actually the case (see, e.g., Hughes, 1976, Gregg, 1994 or Levitas, 
1996 for the experience in the United Kingdom). 
4.2 Misrepresentation and reactance 
Similarly, when individuals become aware that the well-being level they report influences the 
behavior of political actors, they have an incentive to misrepresent it. Imagine, for example, a 
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fiscal equalization scheme that takes into consideration people’s subjective well-being across 
regions. Misrepresenting one’s state of well-being in self-reports has little cost. Moreover, I 
am not aware of an incentive-compatible mechanism for the measurement of subjective well-
being. People’s motivation to truthfully report their perceived well-being is thus a crucial 
precondition for any well-being evidence oriented politics. How can this motivation be 
maintained? How can non-deliberate or even strategic answers be prevented? Answers to 
these questions should be part of any broader well-being perspective on public policy.  
The idea that people react if they feel threatened in their freedom is well established in 
psychology as reactance (Brehm, 1966). A counter-response might thus occur if people feel 
they are part of an engineering problem that includes the reporting of their subjective well-
being but little other involvement.10  
4.3 Avoidance and outcome orientation 
Reactions to a well-being policy that is perceived as technocratic might be strategic or 
apathetic and neglectful. Under both conditions, for different reasons though, a relationship 
between some outcome measure and people’s subjective well-being may no longer be 
observed once policy measures try to exploit it. This might hold in particular for policy 
measures that involve any kind of transfer, be it in terms of money, services or personal 
attention. The problem that people avoid an intervention (or game the system) is well-known 
in economics and dubbed the Lucas critique in macro. 
A subtler problem arises when the outcome measure in terms of subjective well-being 
becomes the primary orientation and replaces the necessary constant debate regarding the 
importance of various societal problems and the corresponding readjustment and 
reorientation of public policy towards more intermediate outcomes as well as the further 
development of basic rules to provide a more productive constitutional framework. This 
essential part of the democratic process is seemingly superfluous when the policy problem 
can be reduced to the ranking of projects in terms of their contribution to some well-being 
indicator. It takes away an important and productive task in which traditionally parties and 
political entrepreneurs engage themselves alongside citizens and the public administration. 
 
10 A similar concern is discussed for behavioral public policy by De Jonge et al. (2018). 
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5 Procedural utility versus individuals as ‘metric stations’ 
Ideas about citizens’ involvement in government decision-making differ depending on the 
policy perspective. Conceptually, citizens play no active role when a well-being policy is 
oriented towards the maximization of reported well-being. Citizens are in fact reduced to 
‘metric stations’. In other words (as cynics might express it), rather than having a say on issues 
in politics, they become targets of mental state management. This disregards the fact that 
citizens have preferences for processes over and above outcomes. They gain procedural utility 
from living and acting under institutionalized processes, which offer them possibilities for self-
determination in the economy and polity, contributing to a positive sense of self. Specifically, 
processes contribute directly to people’s well-being if they address innate needs for 
autonomy, relatedness, and competence (for an introductory review, see Frey et al., 2004). 
Lane (1988) emphasizes the procedural goods of democracy when people feel respected and 
treated with dignity and perceive some personal control, understanding, and public 
resonance.11 The ‘gilets jaunes’ movement in France might be a behavioral reflection of the 
consequences when people feel the absence of procedural qualities. 
The political agency of citizens and an engineering perspective of well-being policy are thus 
difficult to reconcile. This holds for the reporting of subjective well-being as well as the 
reporting of weights that should then be applied in the maximization of some social welfare 
function (for the aspect of asking people about the weight given to various groups in the 
aggregate well-being function, see, e.g., O’Donnell and Oswald, 2015 or Frijters et al., 2019).  
 
11 In corresponding empirical research, Stutzer and Frey (2006) discuss the potential gains in procedural 
utility from democracy and show in their study, which is applied to direct democracy, that the positive 
correlation with life satisfaction is larger for citizens than for foreigners. They argue that, because 
citizens have access to the direct democratic process, they can reap procedural benefits in addition to 
the outcome benefits that are available to all inhabitants. In the development context, Olken (2010) 
evaluates different democratic processes based on a field experiment. Before development projects 
were chosen in forty-nine Indonesian villages, responsibility for the decisions was randomly assigned 
either to delegated representatives or to all villagers, who decided in direct ballot voting. While there 
was little difference in the projects chosen, villagers who had a direct say in the project selection 
reported a much higher level of satisfaction with their choice, expected to benefit more, and were 
more likely to consider the proposal fair. 
 13 
6 Concluding remarks outside of the maximization paradigm 
The policy paradigm matters for the choice of research questions and thus for the kind of 
knowledge well-being research aims to provide, as well as for the people seen as addressees. 
Based on the various considerations about a well-being oriented public policy, I would like to 
draw six conclusions.  
First, measures of subjective well-being offer a most interesting complementary indicator for 
evaluating public policies. While they can serve as close proxies for individual welfare, they 
should still not be used as a primary policy goal. Instead, they serve best in the diagnosis of 
societal problems and alternative institutional approaches to addressing them.  
Second, keeping survey questions about subjective well-being as one of several inputs 
informing public policy rather than establishing them as key performance indicators that are 
directly linked to policy decisions will hopefully allow maintaining the motivation of citizens 
to truthfully report their well-being. 
Third, well-being research teaches us modesty in what we assume can be learned and known. 
On the one hand, the pretense of knowledge should be no issue due to the complexity arising 
from the organizational problems of interlinked societies. On the other, caution is advisable if 
one takes into account that people experience anticipatory well-being, adapt more or less to 
changes in circumstances, engage in social comparisons, and form aspirations - all well-being 
relevant aspects affected by their institutional environment. 
Fourth, a perspective oriented towards the maximization of some indicator of well-being 
cannot address the normative issue; for example, of whether to tax those people more who 
more easily adapt to it. Following this line there are several more issues that require a broader 
policy perspective. For example, should a well-being policy react to any of people’s 
sensitivities or should, instead, processes be set up so that people reflect more on their own 
preferences? Or what about the manipulation of expectations, the chemical induction of well-
being via psychotropic drugs, or the brain-in-a-vat experiments whereby real outcomes are 
replaced by subjective impressions of them? These issues cannot be answered within a well-
being maximization calculus, but must be decided at a more fundamental level.  
Fifth, the constitutional approach provides a theoretically consistent alternative normative 
framework for guiding well-being research in the field of public policy. In particular, it 
acknowledges the central role that basic institutions play in forming public policy designed to 
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raise individuals’ well-being. At the constitutional level, behind the veil of uncertainty, the 
fundamental rules and institutions are set that determine the decisions taken in the current 
politico-economic process. The legitimacy of political action finally rests on voluntary 
agreement on these fundamental rules by the citizens involved. In particular, individuals’ 
sovereignty includes the choice of how to best pursue their well-being. This holds for both the 
private and the collective realm. Individual sovereignty must not be reduced to a citizen’s 
obligation to report his or her subjective well-being, which is then aggregated into a well-being 
indicator supposed to be maximized by government.  
The political process should, rather, be institutionally structured so that people’s interests 
become the principal controlling force in politics. Fundamental institutions, or rules of the 
game, have to be established that provide politicians and public bureaucrats with the 
motivation and information to adequately respond to people’s preferences. Well-being 
research provides insights into how and to what extent institutions have systematic effects on 
indicators of individual subjective well-being. The focus is on rules and institutions, including 
written constitutional rules, state laws, social norms, traditions, and even self-binding 
mechanisms.  
Sixth, well-being research also helps to improve policy decisions within the given rules of the 
game. The improved measurement of subjective well-being strengthens political competition 
by allowing decision makers to better evaluate the benefits provided by public goods and to 
compare various measures assessing the state of society.  
In sum, the results gained from well-being research should be taken as inputs into the political 
process. These inputs have to prove themselves in political competition and in the discourse 
among citizens, and between citizens and politicians. 
 
  
 15 
References 
Al-Ubaydli, O., List, J. A. and Suskind, D. (2019). The Science of Using Science: Towards an 
Understanding of the Threats to Scaling Experiments. NBER Working Paper No. 
w25848. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Bernheim, B. D. and Taubinsky, D. (2018). Behavioral Public Economics. In: Bernheim, B. D., 
DellaVigna, S. and Laibson, D. (eds.). Handbook of Behavioral Economics - Foundations 
and Applications 1, Volume 1. Amsterdam: North-Holland: 381-516. 
Bok, D. (2010). The Politics of Happiness: What Government Can Learn from the New Research 
on Well-Being. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Brehm, J. W. (1966). A Theory of Psychological Reactance. Oxford: Academic Press.  
Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J. M. (1986). The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Buchanan, J. M. and Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations of 
Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Carroll, N., Frijters, P. and Shields, M. A. (2009). Quantifying the Costs of Drought: New 
Evidence from Life Satisfaction Data. Journal of Population Economics 22 (2): 445-461. 
Clark, A. E. (2003). Unemployment as a Social Norm: Psychological Evidence from Panel Data. 
Journal of Labor Economics 21 (2): 323-351. 
Clark, A. E. (2016). SWB as a Measure of Individual Well-Being In: Adler M. D. and Fleurbaey, 
M. (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
Clark, A. E. (2018). Four Decades of the Economics of Happiness: Where Next? Review of 
Income and Wealth 64 (2): 245-269. 
Clark, A. E. and Postel-Vinay, F. (2009). Job Security and Job Protection. Oxford Economic 
Papers 61 (2): 207-239. 
David, S., Boniwell, I. and Conley Ayers, A. (2013). Oxford Handbook of Happiness. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
De Jonge, P., Zeelenberg, M. and Verlegh, P. W. (2018). Putting the Public Back in Behavioral 
Public Policy. Behavioural Public Policy 2 (2): 218-226. 
Diener, E., Lucas, R. E., Schimmack, U. and Helliwell, J. F. (2009). Well-Being for Public Policy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dolan, P. and Fujiwara, D. (2016). Happiness-Based Policy Analysis. In: Adler, M. D. and 
Fleurbaey, M. (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
Finkelstein, A., Luttmer, E. F. and Notowidigdo, M. J. (2013). What Good is Wealth Without 
Health? The Effect of Health on the Marginal Utility of Consumption. Journal of the 
European Economic Association 11 (S1): 221-258. 
Frey, B. S. (2008). Happiness: A Revolution in Economics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Frey, B. S., Luechinger, S. and Stutzer, A. (2009). The Life Satisfaction Approach to the Value 
of Public Goods: The Case of Terrorism. Public Choice 138 (3-4): 317-345. 
Frey, B. S., Luechinger, S. and Stutzer, A. (2010). The Life Satisfaction Approach to 
Environmental Valuation. Annual Review of Resource Economics 2: 139-160. 
 16 
Frey, B. S. and Stutzer, A. (2002a). Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and 
Institutions Affect Well-Being. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Frey, B. S. and Stutzer, A. (2002b). What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research? 
Journal of Economic Literature 40 (2): 402-435. 
Frey, B. S. and Stutzer, A. (2012). The Use of Happiness Research for Public Policy. Social Choice 
and Welfare 38 (4): 659–674. 
Frey, B. S. and Stutzer, A. (2014). Economic Consequences of Mispredicting Utility. Journal of 
Happiness Studies 15 (4): 937–956. 
Frey, B. S. and Stutzer, A. (2019). Public Choice and Happiness. In: Congleton, R. D., Grofman, 
B. and Voigt, S. (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 779-795. 
Frey, B. S., Benz, M., and Stutzer, A. (2004). Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, But 
Also How Matters. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160 (3): 377-401. 
Frijters, P., Clark, A., Krekel, C. and Layard, R. (2019). A Happy Choice: Wellbeing as the Goal 
of Government. Forthcoming in Behavioural Public Policy. 
Graham, C. (2017). Happiness for All? Unequal Hopes and Lives in Pursuit of the American 
Dream. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Gregg, P. (1994). Out for the Count: A Social Scientist's Analysis of Unemployment Statistics in 
the UK. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 157 (2): 253-270. 
Gruber, J. H. and Mullainathan, S. (2005). Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers Happier? 
Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy 5: 1–43. 
Hämäläinen, T. J. and Michaelson, J. (2014). Well-Being and Beyond: Broadening the Public 
and Policy Discourse. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Helliwell, J. F., Layard, R. and Sachs, J. (2019). World Happiness Report 2019. New York: 
Sustainable Development Solutions Network.  
Helliwell, J. F. et al. (2019). How to Open Doors to Happiness. In: Sachs, J. D., Adler, A., Bin 
Bishr, A., de Neve, J. E., Durand, M., Diener, E., Helliwell, J. F., Layard, R. and Seligman, 
M. (2019). Global Happiness and Wellbeing. Policy Report 2019. New York: Global 
Council for Happiness and Wellbeing: 8-25.   
Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan. In: Richard Tuck (ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996. 
Hughes, J. J. (1976). The Measurement of Unemployment: An Exercise in Political Economy?. 
Industrial Relations Journal 7 (4): 4-12. 
Jung, S. and Clark, A. E. (2017). Does Compulsory Education Really Increase Life Satisfaction? 
IBER Working Paper Series No. 2017-6, Inha University, Institute of Business and 
Economic Research. 
Kahneman, D. and Krueger, A. B. (2006). Developments in the Measurement of Subjective 
Well-Being. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20 (1): 3-24. 
Kahneman, D. and Thaler, R. H. (2006). Anomalies: Utility Maximization and Experienced 
Utility. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20 (1): 221–234. 
Kahneman, D., Wakker, P. P. and Sarin, R. (1997). Back to Bentham? Explorations of 
Experienced Utility. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (2): 375–405. 
 17 
Krekel, C. and Zerrahn, A. (2017). Does the Presence of Wind Turbines Have Negative 
Externalities for People in Their Surroundings? Evidence from Well-Being Data. Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management 82: 221-238. 
Lane, R. E. (1988). Procedural Goods in a Democracy: How One Is Treated Versus What One 
Gets. Social Justice Research 2 (3): 177-192. 
Layard, R. (2005). Happiness: Lessons from a New Science. New York: Penguin. 
Levinson, A. (2012). Valuing Public Goods Using Happiness Data: The Case of Air Quality. 
Journal of Public Economics 96 (9): 869-880. 
Levitas, R. (1996). Fiddling while Britain Burns? The “Measurement” of Unemployment. In: 
Levitas, R. and Guy, W. (eds.). Interpreting Official Statistics. London and New York: 
Routledge: 45-65. 
Loewenstein, G., O’Donoghue, T. and Rabin, M. (2003). Projection Bias in Predicting Future 
Utility. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4): 1209–1248. 
Luechinger, S. (2009). Valuing Air Quality Using the Life Satisfaction Approach. Economic 
Journal 119 (536): 482-515.  
Luechinger, S., Meier, S. and Stutzer, A. (2010). Why Does Unemployment Hurt the Employed? 
Evidence from the Life Satisfaction Gap Between the Public and the Private Sector. 
Journal of Human Resources 45 (4): 998–1045. 
Luechinger, S. and Raschky, P. A. (2009). Valuing Flood Disasters Using the Life Satisfaction 
Approach. Journal of Public Economics 93 (3-4): 620-633. 
Lyubomirsky, S., King, L., and Diener, E. (2005). The Benefits of Frequent Positive Affect: Does 
Happiness Lead to Success?. Psychological Bulletin 131 (6): 803-855. 
Manning, M., Fleming, C. M. and Ambrey, C. L. (2016). Life Satisfaction and Individual 
Willingness to Pay for Crime Reduction. Regional Studies 50 (12): 2024-2039. 
Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public Choice III. Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press. 
O’Donnell, G., Deaton, A., Durand, M., Halpern, D. and Layard, R. (2014). Well-Being and 
Policy., London: Legatum Institute. 
O'Donnell, G. and Andrew, J. O. (2015). National Well-Being Policy and a Weighted Approach 
to Human Feelings. Ecological Economics 120: 59-70. 
Odermatt, R. and Stutzer, A. (2015). Smoking Bans, Cigarette Prices and Life Satisfaction. 
Journal of Health Economics 44: 176–194. 
Odermatt, R. and Stutzer, A. (2018). Subjective Well-Being and Public Policy. In: Diener, E., 
Oishi, S. and Tay, L. (eds.). Handbook of Well-Being. Noba Scholar Handbook Series: 
Subjective Well-being. Salt Lake City: UT: DEF Publishers. DOI:nobasch 
Odermatt, R. and Stutzer, A. (2019). (Mis-)Predicted Subjective Well-Being Following Life 
Events. Journal of the European Economic Association 17 (1): 245–283. 
Olken, B. A. (2010). Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field 
Experiment in Indonesia. American Political Science Review 104 (2): 243-267. 
Oreopoulos, P. (2007). Do Dropouts Drop Out Too Soon? Wealth, Health and Happiness from 
Compulsory Schooling. Journal of Public Economics 91 (11-12): 2213-2229. 
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 18 
Sachs, J. D., Adler, A., Bin Bishr, A., de Neve, J. E., Durand, M., Diener, E., Helliwell, J. F., Layard, 
R. and Seligman, M. (2019). Global Happiness and Wellbeing. Policy Report 2019. New 
York: Global Council for Happiness and Wellbeing.   
Sheldon, K. M. and Lucas, R. E. (2014). Stability of Happiness: Theories and Evidence on 
Whether Happiness Can Change. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Stutzer, A. and Frey, B. S. (2006). Political Participation and Procedural Utility: An Empirical 
Study. European Journal of Political Research 45 (3): 391-418. 
Stutzer, A. and Frey, B. S. (2010). Recent Advances in the Economics of Individual Subjective 
Well-Being. Social Research 77 (2): 679-714. 
Stutzer, A. and Lalive, R. (2004). The Role of Social Work Norms in Job Searching and Subjective 
Well-Being. Journal of the European Economic Association 2 (4): 696-719. 
Sunstein, C. R. (2019). Ruining Popcorn? The Welfare Effects of Information. Journal of Risk 
and Uncertainty 58: 121-142. 
Van Praag, B. M. S. and Baarsma, B. E. (2005). Using Happiness Surveys to Value Intangibles: 
The Case of Airport Noise. Economic Journal 115 (500): 224-246. 
Welsch, H. (2006). Environment and Happiness: Valuation of Air Pollution Using Life 
Satisfaction Data. Ecological Economics 58 (4): 801–813.  
Welsch, H. and Kühling, J. (2009). Using Happiness Data for Environmental Valuation: Issues 
and Applications. Journal of Economic Surveys 23 (2): 385–406. 
 
